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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KANAWHA AND HOCKING COAL
AND COKE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CARBON COUNTY, a municipal
corporation, and CENTENNIAL
D E V E L O P M E N T COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
13853

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to quiet title to real property.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment
finding plaintiff to be the owner of the surface rights,
defendant Carbon County to be the owner of coal rights,
and dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.
From such judgment plaintiff appeals.
R E L I E F SOUGHT ON A P P E A L
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment and a
judgment in plaintiff's favor as a matter of law, or, in
the alternative, a mandate that the case should be tried.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The action in the lower court was originally filed
by North American Coal Corporation, a corporation, to
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quiet title to a tract of ground in Carbon County described a s :
Township 13 South, Range 10 East, Salt Lake
Meridian, in Section 8: Lot 2 (NWy 4 NEi/4); Lot
3 ( N E y 4 N W y 4 ) ; SWy 4 of N E y 4 ; NWy 4 of S E y 4 ;

SEy4 of Nwy 4 ; NEy4 of swy 4 .
While the suit was pending, North American Coal Corporation sold and conveyed the premises in question to
Kanawha & Hocking Coal and Coke Company (E.21)
and pursuant to stipulation of the parties and order of
the lower court, Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Company was substituted as plaintiff (R.24).
By their answers, both defendants admit that the
plaintiff is the owner of the surface of the land described
in plaintiff's complaint. Both defendants deny that
plaintiff owns the coal underlying said premises and
Carbon County alleges that it is the owner of said coal
rights pursuant to two tax sales. The first of these
sales was for unpaid taxes for the year 1932 and the sale
was followed by the final May sale and an auditor's
deed recorded May 26, 1937 in Book D of Auditor's
Deeds at Page 185. This sale covers a portion of the
premises described a s :
Lots 2 and 3 and the Southwest quarter of the
Northeast quarter and the Southeast quarter of
the Northwest quarter, Section 8, Township 13
South, Eange 10 East, SLM.
The second preliminary tax sale was for the 1944 taxes
and was followed by final May sale and an auditor's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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endorsement, recorded June 13,1949 as E n t r y No. 55783.
The second sale covers the following portion of the
premises:
The NW14SW14; NEy 4 SWy 4 , Section 8, Township 13 South, Range 10 East, SLM.
See (E.7) and exhibits 1 and 2.
By amendment to answer Defendant Carbon County
alleged that plaintiff's complaint is barred by the limitations set forth in Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
The plaintiff's predecessor in title was the Utah
Fuel Company which owned all of the acreage in question. On December 23, 1932, Utah Fuel deeded the surface of the property together with other lands to the
Utah Grazing Lands Company by deed recorded in Book
5-N of Deeds at Page 411. Under date of August 31,
1950, Utah Grazing Lands Company reconveyed the surface of the premises to Utah Fuel Company by deed recorded in Book 5-Y of Deeds, Page 573, in the office of
the County Recorder of Carbon County, Utah.
Pursuant to Requests for Admissions and Interrogatories, the plaintiff set forth its claims as to the invalidity of the tax sales in question (R. 28-29) and also
set forth in detail the facts which constituted actual
possession of the surface of the premises (R.29). Plaintiff also admitted that from 1951 to the time of filing the
Answers, plaintiff had not conducted any drilling operation, nor had the plaintiff or its predecessors entered
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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into the coal seam underlying the premises. The answers
to the Interrogatories further reveal that during this
period of time, no taxes were assessed on the coal rights
and plaintiff paid no taxes.
The plaintiff submitted Interrogatories to the defendant Centennial Development Company (K.ll-12).
Objections were filed to these Interrogatories (R.13).
After hearing, the objections were sustained (R.18-19)
and none of the Interrogatories were answered.
The defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in reliance on the answers to the interrogatories
and admissions. For the purpose of this motion the invalidity of the tax sales was admitted.
Following argument on the defendants' motion, the
court entered a Summary Judgment finding that the
plaintiff is the owner of the surface of the premises in
question; that the defendant Carbon County is the owner
of the coal rights underlying the property and dismissing
the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice (R.55-56).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY LIMITATION STATUTES AS THERE HAS BEEN NO
SEVERANCE OF TITLE.

Appellant has searched in vain for Utah cases specifically dealing with the situation presented here. The
Utah cases on the subject deal with surface rights where
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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taxes were assessed and paid and either the legal title
holder or the tax title claimant asserted actual physical
possession of the premises.
The only defense relied upon by both defendants is
that the plaintiff's action is barred by the provisions of
Section 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2 Utah Code Annotated,
1953 as amended. These sections provide as follows:
"78-12-5.1. Seizure or possession within seven
years — Provisio — Tax title. No action for the
recovery of real property or for the possession
thereof shall be maintained, unless the plaintiff
or his predecessor was seized or possessed of
such property within seven years from the commencement of such action; provided, however,
that with respect to actions or defenses brought
or interposed for the recovery or possession of
or to quiet title or determine the ownership of
real property against the holder of a tax title to
such property, no such action or defense shall be
commenced or interposed more than four years
after the date of the tax deed, conveyance, or
transfer creating such tax title unless the person
commencing or interposing such action or defense
or his predecessor has actually occupied or been
in possession of such property within four years
prior to the commencement or interposition of
such action or defense or within one year from
the effective date of this amendment.
"78-12-5.2. Holder of tax title — Limitations of
action or defense—Proviso. No action or defense
for the recovery or possession of real property
or to quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or interposed against the
holder of a tax title after the expiration of four
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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years from the date of the sale, conveyance or
transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly
to any other purchaser thereof at any public or
private tax sale and after the expiration of one
year from the date of this act. Provided, however,
that this section shall not bar any action or defense by the owner of the legal title to such property where he or his predecessor has actually
occupied or been in actual possession of such property within four years from the commencement
or interposition of such action or defense. And
provided further, that this section shall not bar
any defense by a city or town, to an action by the
holder of a tax title to the effect that such city
or town holds a lien against such property which
is equal or superior to the claim of the holder of
such tax title."
The plaintiff has alleged and the defendants admit
that the plaintiff is now and at all times has been the
fee owner of the surface of the lands in question. This
was expressly found by the trial court in its Summary
Judgment. In their memorandum sujyporting the Motion
for Summary Judgment, the defendants recognize the
general rule as set forth in an annotation 35 ALE2d
129:
"Where there is no severance of the title to the
surface estate from title to the underlying mineral
estate, adverse possession of the surface for the
statutory period gives title to the minerals by
adverse possession.''
Following this statement of the rule are numerous citations from various states.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is the plaintiff's position that this rule is applicable, and therefore, the plaintiff's admitted continuous
possession of the surface constitutes possession of the
subsurface minerals. The limitations statutes, thus by
their own terms, do not apply to bar the action since
plaintiff was in possession as required under the statute.
The defendants have shown no severance of title
to the surface estate from title to the underlying minerals.
For a severance to be effected, there must be a
valid deed or conveyance.
In Gill vs. Colton (4th Circuit, 1926) 12 Fed. 2d 531,
the Court held that there was no severance of the mineral
and surface estate because a deed purporting to sever
the premises w^as not accepted by the grantee; a third
party had already contracted to purchase the property
and he had no notice of the unrecorded deed. Going on,
the court states the general rule:
"Unless there has been a severance, it is a general
presumption that one who has possession of the
surface, has possession of the sub-soil also."
In Morse vs. Shackelford (6th Circuit, 1926) 9 Fed.
2d 907, the court held that an attempted severance of a
mineral and surface title was ineffective where the grantor had already conveyed without reservation. It is
further stated that:
"The first grantee, by possession of the surface
also had possession of the minerals."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In Rio Bravo Oil Company vs. Staley Oil Company,
138 Tex. 198, 158 SW2d 293, the court held that when
adverse possession sets limitation statutes in motion to
mature title to the surface estate in a claimant, execution and delivery of a mineral lease by another, even
during the period that the limitations are so running,
will not operate as a severance so as to defeat the claimant's title to the mineral estate, as well as the surface
estate. The court stated: "Only an effective deed will
operate to sever the two estates." (Emphasis added)
See also to the same effect on the matter of severance
Redmond vs. Cass (1907) 226 111. 120, 80 NE 708.
In Piersonvs. Case (1961), 272 Ala. 527, 133 Southern 2d 239, a purchaser under an invalid tax deed sued
to quiet title showing exclusive possession of the surface.
The court held that such adverse possession of surface
under color of title inured to the benefit of mineral
claimants — the grantees of the surface claimant. The
basis of the holding was that there could only be a severance by the legal owner.
Hwisley vs. Valter, 12 111. 2d 608,147 NE2d 356 holds
that adverse possession of the surface will inure to the
benefit of mineral interests which were separated subsequent to the commencement of adverse possession. The
court states that this is not in conflict with holdings
that where severance occurs prior to adverse possession
commencing the possession of the surface does not itself
result in prescriptive rights to the minerals.
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POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY LIMITATION STATUTES SINCE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT
BEEN DISPOSSESSED.

As stated in Volume 1, Thompson on Real
page 131:

Property,

"It is the right of the owner of the freehold estate
to the possession and enjoyment thereof and possession is presumed unless the contrary is shown."
(Citing Ownbey vs. Parkway Properties, 222 NC
54, 21 SE2d 900)
"Actual possession of a portion of a tract of land
by the rightful and legal owner of the entire tract,
constitutes constructive possession of the whole,
but such possession continues unimpaired so long
as there is not, in fact, an actual possession and
occupancy by one claiming title by adverse possession." (Citing Acosta vs. Nunez (La. App.), 5
Southern 2d 574)
Seisin once established is presumed to continue until contrary is proved. (Tesar vs. Bartels, 148 Neb. 889,
32 NW2d 911, 2 ALR2d 1037)
Speaking of what is necessary to show possession
of subsurface minerals, it is said in Thompson on Real
Property, Vol. 1A, page 77, that i t :
" . . . must be actual, notorious, exhaustive, continuous and hostile for the statutory period in the
same manner as a stranger. Actual possession is
shown by opening and operating the mine and the
possession is continuous if the operation is carried on at such seasons as the nature of the work
permits or the custom of the neighborhood reDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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quires. I t is not required that the act of ownership should be done every day or month or at any
definite intervals, but they should be of such
frequency and character that they would at all
times apprise the owner that his seisin is being
interrupted and his title endangered." (Citing
Calvat vs. Jukm, 119 Col. 561, 206 P2d 600; Vorhes vs. Dennison, 300 Ken. 427, 189 SW2d 269;
Rose vs. Martin, 310 Ken. 193, 220 SW2d 385;
Gordon vs. Park, 219 Mo. 600, 117 SW 1163)
In Moore vs. Empire Land Company (1913), 181
Ala. 344, 61 Southern 940, a fee owner of land conveyed
the surface separate and apart from the minerals and
the grantee and his successors were in actual possession
of the surface with no one in the actual possession of
the minerals. The court held that adverse possession of
the surface gave title by adverse possession to the minemis pointing out that the conveyance of the surface
separate and apart from the minerals was a legal fiction
and in the absence of physical possession of the mineral
interest distinct from possession of the surface, did not
operate to sever the possession of the mineral rights and
the rights being held by the possessor of the surface.
Consequently, in absence of a physical severance, the
possession of the minerals went with and followed the
possession of the surface.
Where a person in possession of mineral land continues his possession for the full length of the limitation
period, a deed executed by him during his possession
which severs the mineral rights from the surface does
not stop the running of the statute of limitations in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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favor of the mineral rights. Kilpatrich vs. Gulf Production Company (1940 Tex.), 139 SW2d 653. To the same
effect see Crawford vs. Humble Oil and Refining Company (1941 Tex.), 150 SW2d 849.
In 35 ALR2d at page 149 the general rule is stated
that where a person is in adverse possession of unsevered
mineral land and the owner of land or the one in actual
adverse possession conveys or leases the mineral estate,
the adverse possession will continue in the same manner
as if there had been no conveyance or release. Cited in
support of this general rule are cases from Alabama,
Kentucky, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Texas and Virginia.
As stated in Vol. 1A, Thompson on Real
Mines and Minerals, Section 165 at page 76:

Property,

"Where the adverse possession of the surface
commences before the mineral severance by the
title holder, the adverse possession continues to
own against the mineral severance/' Huddleston
vs. Peel, 238 Miss. 798, 119 Southern 2d 921, 120
Southern 2d 776; Birdwell vs. American Bonding
Company (Tex. Civil App.), 337 SW2d 120.
In Payne vs. Fruh Company (North Dakota, 1959)
98 NW2d 27, is there held that where one jDerson owned
the surface and subsurface until after the accrual of
taxes and issuance of a deed to the county, the tax title
constituted a title to the entire land, including the minerals. Possession of the surface under the tax title constituted possession of the minerals even though there was
a mineral conveyance after the date of the tax deed. This
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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case is the reverse of the present situation, where the
minerals were sold for taxes although the title holder
owned both the surface and subsurface.
In Huntington City, a municipal corporation vs. C.
W. Peterson, 30 Ut2d 408, 518 P2d 1246, this court decided :
"Until levy and assessment are made, there is no
tax lien on realty; but when made, the tax relates
back to the owner as of January 1st of the taxable
year."
On January 1, 1932 title to all of the premises described
in the complaint, both surface and subsurface, was vested
in Utah Fuel Company. Not until December of 1932 was
the surface title conveyed by Utah Fuel Company to
Utah Grrazing Lands Company. The rule laid down in
Payne vs. Fruh Company Supra is therefore applicable.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the District Court should be revised since the plaintiff's cause of action is not barred
by the statutes of limitation. Plaintiff and its predecessors have admittedly always owned and been in possession of the surface of the property in question. The defendants have shown no severance of title, which can
only occur by a valid conveyance or reservation. The
tax sales are admittedly invalid and therefore cannot
constitute a severance of the subsurface and surface
estates. Even if this were the case, as to the 1932 tax
sale, the authorities are clear that where the fee owner
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is in possession of the surface prior to a mineral severance, such possession continues against the mineral
severance. Furthermore, there has been no dispossession
of the record owner nor taking possession by the tax title
claimant and under the authorities, possession in the
owner of the fee title is presumed to continue under such
circumstances.
It is respectfully submitted that the Summary Judgment should be reversed and the case remanded with
directions to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants to quiet plaintiff's title to the
mineral rights. In the alternative, the mandate should
be that the case be fully tried.
Respectfully

submitted,

WALLACE D. HUED
Attorney for Plaintiff
1011 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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